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Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements:
Reflections on Attorneys’ Fiduciary Obligations and
Professional Responsibility Duties
Carol A. Needham*
INTRODUCTION
This Article highlights two key issues that must be addressed when
considering an aggregate settlement: (1) client autonomy, particularly in
determining the goals of the representation; and (2) the scope of
lawyers’ fiduciary duties, specifically the duty of loyalty owed to each
client. These are crucial elements in the analysis of attorneys’
obligations in the representation of any client, but they merit enhanced
attention in situations where the lawyer represents two or more clients
in litigation resolved through an aggregate settlement.
The term “aggregate settlement” has been used to refer to the
settlement of collectively litigated cases that are not class actions.
Some non-class aggregate litigation results from the use of formal
procedural devices, such as joinder,1 multidistrict transfer,2 and
consolidation.3 Still, other groups of cases are litigated together even
* Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. The author serves as AALS Professional
Responsibility Section Liaison to the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility and is a former member of the AALS Committee on Bar Admission and Lawyer
Performance. My thanks to John Breen and the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, who
shaped the symposium of which this article is a part, and to Howard Erichson, Kathleen Clark and
Judith McMorrow, whose insights considerably advanced earlier drafts. Lynn Hartke provided
invaluable research assistance, for which I am most grateful.
1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20. Under the permissive joinder rule, plaintiffs may seek relief in a
single lawsuit so long as the asserted right to relief arises out of the “same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and a “question of law or fact common to all
plaintiffs will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A)–(B). Defendants may be joined in
a single action when “any right to relief is asserted against them . . . with respect to or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “any question of
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (setting forth the federal regulations for multidistrict
legislation). Multidistrict transfer—authorized under the provisions of this statute—may proceed
as set forth in the Rules of Procedure of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL), promulgated pursuant to the MDL Panel’s authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f)
(2006). See id.
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (“If actions before the court involve a common question of law or
fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2)
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though they have not been officially brought into a single action.4 To
further complicate the picture, lawyers representing similarly situated
clients sometimes opt to engage in a series of representations involving
settlement negotiations. These lawyers specifically characterize these
arrangements as being conducted on a non-aggregated basis. As one
example, a lawyer who represented plaintiffs seeking overtime pay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act brought approximately eight
hundred separate cases against the same defendant in courts across the
United States.5
As a result of the multiplicity of contexts in which such aggregated
non-class action proceedings can move forward, it is important to make
clear that the discussion in this Article focuses on the settlement offers
that may conclude the litigation, rather than on other aspects of
aggregate litigation. Although there is no universally accepted
delineation of which case types fall under the term “aggregate
litigation,” Howard Erichson’s noteworthy article, A Typology of
Aggregate Settlements, remains the most comprehensive attempt to
systematically address the phenomenon.6 This Article focuses on the
negotiated conclusion of litigation—“aggregate settlement”—that the
American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation (“Principles”) defines as the “settlement of the claims of two
or more individual claimants in which the resolution of the claims is
interdependent,” such that “the value of each claimant’s claim is not
based solely on individual case-by-case facts and negotiations.”7

consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”).
4. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 3.15–3.18
(2010) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (defining non-class aggregate settlements and explaining the
basis and procedure for executing these settlements); Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI
Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 628, 676 (2011) (describing “non-class aggregate settlements” as an “ambitious aspect of
expansionist aggregation” and as including a diverse group of aggregations created through
formal mechanisms); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506, 506 (2011) (explaining that aggregate litigation covers a “set of tools” that
bring plaintiffs together, including joinder consolidation multidistrict transfer, and coordinated
handling).
5. See Murphy v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 1:09CV00007, 2010 WL 4261310 (W.D. Va. Oct. 28,
2010 ).
6. See generally Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1769 (2005) (developing a typology of aggregate settlements by defining collective
settlements in terms of their essential functions, therefore allowing for a more precise way of
understanding and describing such litigation, as well as their applied ethical duties).
7. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, discusses settlement of non-class aggregate litigation in
sections 3.15 through 3.18. The term “non-class aggregate settlement” is defined in section 3.16.
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I. CLIENT AUTONOMY
A lawyer representing a group of clients in non-class aggregate
litigation has a separate attorney-client relationship with each client
whose case he is handling on an aggregated basis. He owes to each of
the clients the full complement of duties that the lawyer would owe to
any client he represents in traditional litigation. Included in these
obligations is the duty to allow each of his clients to exercise the full
scope of autonomy in determining the objectives of the representation
under Rule 1.2(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model
Rules”).8 The lawyer must also communicate with each client
individually regarding the client’s desires about whether to accept a
settlement offer. However, as Tom Morgan has rightly pointed out, the
lawyer’s traditional duty of particularized representation of each
individual client exists in tension with the goals of judges and lawyers,
who seek efficiency in case administration and allocation of judicial
resources.9
As Charles Silver and Lynn Baker noted in their seminal article on
aggregate settlements, aggregating claims that are not worth enough to
be effectively brought individually allows those claimants to achieve a
result that would be unattainable if the claims were considered
separately.10 However, as Tom Morgan has discussed,11 a central claim
relating to client autonomy made by Silver and Baker is the idea that a
client should be allowed to contract around the requirements of Model
Rule 1.8(g) when that client decides doing so is in his interest.12 Since
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).
9. Thomas D. Morgan, Client Representation vs. Case Administration: The ALI Looks at
Legal Ethics Issues in Aggregate Settlements, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 734, 740 (2011).
10. Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 763 (1997).
11. See Morgan, supra note 9, at 745 (noting that Silver & Baker’s proposal was not well
received and even before the ALI project was finished, it was determined that Rule 1.8(g) did not
limit legitimate settlement arrangements to the extent the Professor had stated).
12. As the Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) provides,
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client gives
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure shall
include the existence and nature of all the claims . . . involved and of the participation
of each person in the settlement.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g). Comment 13 to Model Rule 1.8 highlights some
of the key aspects of aggregate settlement practice:
Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks
of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this
is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as
part of the process of obtaining the client’s informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a)
protects each client’s right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject
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professional responsibility standards allow a client to authorize his
lawyer to settle an individual legal matter (within stated parameters) in
advance of a settlement negotiation—Silver and Baker argue—a client
should also have the ability to provide advance consent to whatever
settlement terms are approved by a specified majority of the other
clients being represented by that lawyer in related litigation.13
The duty of loyalty a lawyer owes to each of his clients is a
foundational principle of the attorney-client relationship.14 In addition
to mandating that the lawyer avoid conflicts of interest,15 the duty of
loyalty includes an obligation to work diligently on behalf of the
client,16 provide competent representation,17 communicate effectively
with the client regarding the representation,18 and consult with the client
regarding the matters essential to the representation.19 In the attorneyclient relationship, each of an attorney’s clients must be afforded the
ability to direct the goals of the representation. This remains the case
even when the lawyer is representing a number of clients in related
matters. One of the enduring problems of aggregate litigation is the
an offer of settlement . . . . The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these
Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer . . . is made or accepted on behalf
of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms or
the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement . . .
is accepted.
Id. R. 1.8 cmt. 13.
13. Silver & Baker, supra note 10, at 763.
14. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 146 (1986) (“Whatever may be the
models that obtain in other legal cultures, the client-lawyer relationship in the United States is
founded on the lawyer’s virtually total loyalty to the client and the client’s interests.”) (internal
cross-references omitted)); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An
Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 21 (1987) (“In the relationship with a client,
the lawyer is required above all to demonstrate loyalty.”).
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”).
16. See id. R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”). Note that the Model Rules, although influential, represent only the
consensus reached by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA). The
precise language of a particular standard can (and often does) vary in a given jurisdiction, since
the highest court of each state is the body empowered to declare the professional conduct
standards in effect within that jurisdiction. This Article will refer to the provisions of the Model
Rules where that language reflects the position of the majority of jurisdictions within the United
States.
17. See id. R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.”).
18. See id. R. 1.4. Among others, Rule 1.4 duties include keeping the client reasonably
informed about the status of the case, complying with the client’s reasonable requests for
information, and consulting with the client about the means to achieve the client’s objectives. Id.
19. Id. See also id. R. 1.2 (governing the scope of the representation and the allocation of
authority between lawyer and client).
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clients’ reduced ability to meaningfully direct their representation.20
Among the most significant components of the client’s direction of
the representation is his ability to exercise discretion regarding the
terms of an acceptable settlement and whether to agree to an opposing
litigant’s offer. In his provocative article, Against Settlement, Owen
Fiss articulated well-founded concerns regarding the inability of
individuals involved in aggregate litigation to effectively consent to the
defendant’s settlement offer.21 Even Samuel Issacharoff and Robert
Klonoff concede that Fiss is correct in his view that aggregate litigation
inevitably constrains the autonomy of the individual clients.22 The
Reporter (Issacharoff) and Associate Reporter (Klonoff) for the ALI
Principles assert the necessity of mass settlement as an inevitable
response to “predictable repetitive harms” in a mass society.23
Although they certainly have a depth of knowledge informing their
opinion, they are understandably focused on the wide-angle view—
looking at the justice system at the macro level. The experience of the
individual client remains a significant element of legal ethics analysis,
however, and the lawyers’ duties to each client cannot be brushed off as
an inconvenient relic of a bygone era. Nancy Moore,24 Tom Morgan,25
Howard Erichson,26 and Ben Zipursky,27 among others, have evaluated
proposed innovations regarding the handling of non-class action
aggregate litigation in light of current professional responsibility
20. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009)
(“Individual plaintiffs within collective representation have little substantive input or authority
over how their attorney handles the case.”).
21. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1078–82 (1984).
22. Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1177, 1184 (2009).
23. Id. at 1201.
24. See Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the ALI’s Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity—and More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 718
(2011) (explaining the dearth of any meaningful discussion about ethics rules that apply to
lawyers in aggregate litigation); Nancy J. Moore, The Case against Changing the Aggregate
Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 153 (1999) [hereinafter Moore,
Against Changing] (arguing that a comprehensive reform of attorney ethics is unnecessary).
25. See Morgan, supra note 9 (acknowledging the practical concerns that underlie the ALI’s
proposals regarding aggregate litigation).
26. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy
in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 525–28 (2003) (exploring
the ways in which mass collective representation raises a number of problems and proposing how
to better understand and solve those issues); Howard Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural
and Ethical Implications of Coordination among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L. J. 381
(2000) (contending that the increase in informal aggregation suggests a need for either more
formal aggregation mechanisms or a greater formalization of counsel coordination).
27. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 265, 298–99 (2011).
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standards. Those notable scholars rightly emphasize a nuanced
understanding of the professional obligations a lawyer owes to each of
his clients. Of course, if the highest court in a jurisdiction were
persuaded that clients could be well-served by the court amending its
articulation of lawyers’ duties in a way envisioned by the ALI
Principles, the court could certainly do so. Until a jurisdiction amends
its professional responsibility standards in this way, however, lawyers
are required to comply with the currently articulated standards.
There is a significant difference between, on the one hand, urging
each client to agree to the settlement so that everyone in the group can
share in the settlement, and, on the other hand, pressuring a client to
completely disavow his own goals so that other clients will benefit. In
the latter situation, it is entirely possible that none of the clients view
the particular settlement as a desired result. The clients’ situation is
reminiscent of that portrayed in the O. Henry short story, The Gift of the
Magi, in which a husband gave up his beloved pocket watch so that he
could buy his wife a comb for her luxurious hair, while she sold her hair
to buy her husband a now-useless fob for the heirloom pocket watch he
no longer owns.28 In throttling down their own preferences and trying
to respect the perceived interests of the other, neither husband nor wife
obtained an outcome that suited their needs. O. Henry’s story
emphasizes the selfless love that ultimately motivates each member of
the marriage to place the happiness of the other above his or her own.
In negotiation terminology, however, this result can be seen as a loselose dynamic. While both spouses are sacrificing, neither can use the
gift the other has obtained.
A similar dynamic operated after the April 2007 shootings at Virginia
Tech University, in which Seung Hui Cho killed thirty-two students and
faculty and wounded many others, including seventeen seriously. The
Commonwealth of Virginia and Virginia Tech offered $100,000 to the
estate of each decedent, and reimbursement for medical care and mental
health follow-up to seriously injured survivors. As part of the
settlement offer, both groups of potential litigants were offered access to
written material relevant to the shootings.29 As the deadline for
accepting or rejecting the settlement offer neared, the attorneys handling
the settlement apparently pressured the families to accept the offer out
of fear that “the state might withdraw the offer if not enough people
28. O. HENRY, The Gift of the Magi (1906), in O. HENRY, O. HENRY STORIES 40–48 (1962).
29. Theresa Vargas & J. Freedom du Lac, Va. Tech Massacre: Two Families Push for
Answers, Apology from University, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/va-tech-massacre-two-families-push-for-answers-apology-from-university/2012/03/31/
gIQAArIWnS_story.html.
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agreed to the terms.”30 According to Andrew Goddard, whose son was
injured in the carnage, “Families of the deceased were told: ‘If you
don’t sign the settlement, families of the injured won’t get any money
for medical bills.’ And we were told families of the deceased wouldn’t
get money for funerals and all that stuff if we didn’t sign.”31 As the
deadline approached, family members of those killed were strongly
urged to disregard their own goals for potential litigation in favor of
helping the families whose children were seriously injured.32 At the
same time, plaintiffs whose children had survived were apparently
bullied into acquiescing to a settlement in order to help other plaintiffs
whose family members had died. Lori Hass, the mother of a surviving
student, said:
Frankly I was disgusted with the way the settlement was handled.
People were being told by their attorney, “This is the best offer you’re
going to get. Accept it and exert pressure on other families who might
not accept the settlement.” I got calls saying, “Lori, accept the
settlement—you have to accept.”33

Two of the families, the parents of Erin Peterson and Julia Pryde,
decided against accepting settlement offers. These parties wanted the
opportunity to press Virginia Tech’s President for answers during the
discovery process. One particularly pressing inquiry dealt with why the
school made the decision to not send out an all-campus alert so that
students and university employees would know that two students had
died of gunshot wounds and that the gunman had not yet been
apprehended.
Since Virginia state law capped the recovery in the lawsuits at
$100,000,34 the decision of these two families to litigate rather than
accept a $100,000 settlement offer was not economically sound. There
was a significant risk that there would be no recovery in the lawsuit and
the further expenses of litigation would have been avoided following
acceptance of the settlement offer. But the families decided to litigate
because of a strong desire to hold accountable those running Virginia
Tech and to force them to explain their decision-making process.
Turning down the offer gave these two families the opportunity to
compel discovery of documents that shed light on what the various
university departments had known about the difficulties that Cho, the

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Since 1993 Virginia’s Tort Claims Act has capped potential damages for negligence in
such cases at no more than $100,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (West 2012).
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shooter, had manifested prior to the morning of the shootings.35 These
plaintiffs also had the primary goal of eliciting an explanation of why
the facts observed by departments of public safety, dormitory resident
advisors, and professors who interacted with Cho had remained
separated in information silos, with no mechanism in place to take a
systemic look at the full picture presented by Cho’s increasingly erratic
actions. The families who had accepted the settlement offer had given
up their leverage, and they had no way to get additional information
after they settled their claims. It is crucial that lawyers for plaintiffs in
such circumstances fully elaborate the advantages and disadvantages of
accepting a settlement offer and ensure that the client’s autonomy is
protected during the decision-making process.
The professional standards of ethical conduct for lawyers are
expressed as unitary statements to be applied across the profession,
rather than explicitly tailored to vary in light of differing types of
representations. The late Steven Krane,36 among others, argued
vigorously that the legal profession should
give serious consideration to abandoning the “one size fits all”
approach to legal regulation applicable across the range of lawyerclient relationships . . . [and instead] explore a more flexible approach
that will more closely comport with the reasonable expectations of
clients and lawyers in the broad range of relationships they have
today.37
35. Lucinda Roy, the former chair of the English Department, gave an excellent account of the
events leading up to the shootings and the choices made by administrators at Virginia Tech on the
day of the shootings. See LUCINDA ROY, NO RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT: THE TRAGEDY AT
VIRGINIA TECH (2009). The book provides details about Roy’s experience attempting to
intervene with counseling services for Cho, who was her former student, and the ways in which
Virginia Tech was, in part, responsible for the tragedy. Id. The book, together with the
Governor’s Commission’s report, provides a useful overview of the context in which the events
unfolded. See VA. TECH. REV. PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH, APRIL 16, 2007:
REPORT OF THE REVIEW PANEL (2007) [hereinafter VA. TECH. SHOOTINGS REPORT], available at
http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport/FullReport.pdf. The Review
Panel concluded that “[t]he lack of information sharing among academic, administrative, and
public safety entities at Virginia Tech and the students who had raised concerns about Cho
contributed to the failure to see the big picture.” VA. TECH. REV. PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT
VIRGINIA TECH: ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE REVIEW PANEL 52 (2009), available at
http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempcontent/techPanelReport-docs/VT_Addendum_12-22009.pdf.
36. Steven Krane, a partner at Proskauer Rose LLP and former chair of the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and the City Bar of New York, led many
efforts to reform the governing regulations to better reflect current practice standards. In
Memoriam: Steven C. Krane, 82-AUG. N.Y. ST. B.J. 23, 23.
37. Steven C. Krane, The Fallacy of the Monolithic Client-Lawyer Relationship: Leaving
1908 and Procrustean Regulation Behind, 2008 J. PROF’L LAW. 43, 44 [hereinafter Krane,
Fallacy]; see also Steven C. Krane, Ethics 2000: What Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
323, 329 (1999) [hereinafter Krane, Ethics] (arguing that the model standards promulgated by the
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Mitt Regan,38 Richard Painter,39 and David Wilkins40 have all
discussed relaxing the strictures imposed on the attorney-client
relationship when an attorney represents sophisticated clients. Defining
which clients will qualify as “sophisticated clients” is not simple, but
the category would include those entities that have in-house counsel
capable of giving the corporation a second opinion of their legal options
or those persons who are “repeat players” with substantial prior
experience with lawyers.41 Given the difficulty of drawing a bright line
so as to be certain, ex ante, which individuals would be regarded as
sufficiently experienced, it is probable that this envisioned restructuring
of the attorney-client relationship would prove problematic for lawyers.
Malpractice insurers, disciplinary counsel, and others scrutinizing the
propriety of the lawyers’ actions may not agree that the client was
indeed sophisticated in certain circumstances.
As reflected in Model Rules 1.2 and 1.4, the client, rather than the
lawyer, is the person who retains the power to determine the goals of
the representation, including the terms of any settlement.42 In carrying
out the lawyer’s obligation to communicate effectively with the client,
the lawyer is required to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation”43 and must obtain informed consent from each client—
confirmed in writing—prior to entering into an aggregate settlement.44
Although these standards may sound straightforward,45 the context in
which informed consent is sought and the background knowledge

ABA, which have influenced the standards enacted by numerous jurisdictions, are premised on
“the fallacy of the monolithic client-lawyer relationship”).
38. Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heehan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The
Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2190–91 (2010).
39. Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 323
(2000).
40. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 887 (1992).
41. See, e.g., Krane, Fallacy, supra note 37, at 48 (suggesting a “hub and spokes” regulatory
structure under which core attorney-client principles are articulated as the irreducible “hub” while
subordinated standards could be elaborated as “spokes”, depending on the role of the lawyer and
the type of client relationship involved in the representation).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation[,] . . . shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued[,] . . . [and] abide by a client’s decision whether to
settle a matter.”).
43. Id. R. 1.4(b).
44. Id. R. 1.8(g).
45. The definition of “informed consent” in the Model Rules reads: “Informed consent
denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” Id. R. 1.0(e).
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possessed by the particular client being asked to consent can vary to
such a degree that it is difficult to articulate a standard in the abstract.
Comment 6 to Model Rule 1.0 notes that the communication needed to
obtain informed consent will vary and that the lawyer is required to
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client
possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed
decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a
disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation,
any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client . . . of the
material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of
conduct and a discussion of the client’s . . . options and alternatives.46

It can be difficult to ascertain whether the lawyer has made the
necessary disclosures to constitute informed consent, and whether the
client actually understands the risks and disadvantages of the action to
which they are giving their assent. Communication between the client
and his lawyer can be even more difficult given the day-to-day realities
of mass tort representation, where claimants’ lawyers’ case inventories
include hundreds or thousands of clients. In these representations, the
theory that the client is directing the attorney’s work is at odds with the
way the work is handled on the ground.47 Any good empiricist would
require more data regarding the interaction between lawyers and clients
in these practice settings before drawing firm conclusions. However,
even at this point, the available evidence supports the conclusion that a
disproportionate share of disciplinary complaints that assert neglect and
failure to communicate are filed by clients in litigation and other
representation in which the client is an individual, rather than by
corporations and other entity clients.48
Though perhaps only imperfectly observed, the “client directs the
representation” principle is critical to the attorney-client relationship:
the client sets the goals for which the attorney is retained, while the
attorney determines the proper way to carry out those goals.49 This
46. Id. R. 1.0 cmt. 6.
47. See Paul R. Tremblay, The Role of Casuistry in Legal Ethics: A Tentative Inquiry, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 493, 501–02 (1994) (describing numerous considerations that a lawyer should
take into account when directing the course of litigation).
48. This opinion is based on the author’s experience as a representative for the National
Organization of Bar Counsel.
49. Perhaps the most cogent discussion of this point in connection with aggregate litigation is
found in Erichson and Zipursky’s article, Consent Versus Closure:
The lawyer’s job is not to make the decision but rather to advise the client about the
pros and cons of the settlement offer and, in the language of [Model] Rule 1.2(a), to
“abide by” the client’s decision. A lawyer who tells the client, “Settle or you’re fired!”
is hardly abiding by the client’s decision.
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 27, at 283–84. Model Rule 1.2(a) states, “a lawyer shall abide
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principle mandates an attorney to consult with the client regarding the
terms of settlement offers, a duty that extends beyond simply conveying
the offer to the client with instructions directing the client to sign and
return by the deadline indicated. The client is supposed to have some
chance to convey his views regarding the terms of the offer in a
substantive discussion with his attorney. Although aggregated for
purposes of efficient handling, each separate claim is just that—a
separate cause of action about which that particular client must have a
chance to make an independent decision regarding whether to settle.
Much has been written on the issue of client consent in connection with
the ALI aggregate litigation project; there is no need to repeat all the
arguments. The key point is this: lawyers’ fiduciary duties, as well as
the requirements of the profession expressed in the Model Rules,
necessitate an individualized analysis of each client’s interests when
negotiating an aggregate settlement of their clients’ claims.
As Nancy Moore pointed out more than a decade ago, it is
exceedingly difficult to ensure that a client’s advance consent to an
aggregate settlement is actually the informed consent to which the client
is entitled.50 The degree of knowledge even a “repeat player” or
sophisticated client possesses about the likelihood of possible outcomes
is unlikely to rise to the level of informed consent, especially when the
lawyer obtains the agreement from the client prior to the start of
settlement negotiations.51 When an attorney requires advance consent
of a client as a condition of entering into the attorney-client relationship,
the client is not freely exercising the ability to direct the representation
as contemplated by the current professional responsibility standards.
Advance consent sought at the outset of the representation is likely to be
insufficiently informed. It would be difficult to counsel the client about
all of the potential disadvantages for settling at a point in time when
little information is available about the context in which a future
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4,
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a). As the rule further provides, “[a] lawyer may take such action on
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.” Id. Although clearly demarcating the
boundaries of the lawyer’s authority can be problematic, the principle here is clear. See, e.g.,
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S
GUIDE 106–07 (2012) (“As a general principle, the lawyer is entitled to make decisions in matters
that do not affect the merits of the cause or substantially prejudice the client’s rights, although,
even in these cases, there may be situations where it would be prudent for the lawyer to confer
with the client. In other situations, the client has the exclusive authority to make decisions.”).
50. See Moore, Against Changing, supra note 24, at 180–81 (discussing what clients
relinquish by giving their informed consent in a class action).
51. Id. at 181.
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settlement offer might be made. Howard Erichson and Benjamin
Zipursky have objected to advance consent waivers, not only because
they put too much control into the hands of the claimants’ lawyers to
determine when and on what terms to settle, but also because the
conflicts of interest inherent in aggregate settlements cannot be
consented to in advance under the terms of Model Rule 1.7(b).52 The
conflicts of interest issues are indeed intractable.
As articulated in Model Rule 1.7(a)(2), “a concurrent conflict of
interests exists if . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client . . . or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.”53 In addition to the possible conflict between the lawyer’s
own interest in efficiently reaching the conclusion of the litigation and
an individual client’s interest in satisfying his goals for the
representation, in aggregate litigation there is a heightened danger that
the interests of one client will conflict with those of another of the
lawyer’s concurrent clients. The factual context of the aggregated
litigation can vary widely, of course. But from the standpoint of any
individual client whose lawyer is conducting such a representation,
there is a zero-sum problem: an inherent conflict between each of the
claimants and the other claimants to the limited fund from which all
settlements will be paid.
The judicial opinions and scholarly
commentary analyzing permissible and impermissible conflicts when a
lawyer conducts a multiple-client representation are instructive here.
The classic multiple-client representation involves an engagement in
which a lawyer in a single matter represents more than one client. For
example, a lawyer who defends one or more executives along with a
corporation in shareholder derivative litigation is engaging in a
multiple-client representation. This situation is similar to those in
which a husband and wife retain the same lawyer to draw up a will.
Representing more than one party in the same legal matter necessarily
involves a conflict of interest, though it is often a consentable conflict,
even when those parties are seemingly allied.54 In the lawyer’s
52. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 27, at 300–11 (discussing the issues with advance
consent, including inauthentic consent and non-consentable conflicts); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 1.7(b) (2012) (allowing a lawyer to represent a client when there is a concurrent
conflict of interest if four requirements are met).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2).
54. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87 (2011) (discussing the inter-personal dimension in non-class
aggregation); ROY D. SIMON, CAROL A. NEEDHAM & BURNELE V. POWELL, LAWYERS AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION: CASES AND MATERIALS 334–35 (4th ed. 2009) (analyzing the conflicts of
representation for allied parties).
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explanation of the advantages and risks of having one lawyer jointly
represent multiple parties in a single legal matter, he is required to make
each client aware of “the relevant circumstances and of the material and
reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects
on the interests of that client.”55 Furthermore, the lawyer must explain,
in detail, “the implications of the common representation, including
possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege and the advantages and risks involved.”56 Even with adequate
informed consent, the handling of each client’s confidential information
can present an insurmountable barrier to continuing to represent the
multiple clients.57 As elaborated in Comment 31 to Model Rule 1.7,
[C]ontinued common representation will almost certainly be
inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other
client information relevant to the common representation. This is so
because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and
each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the
representation that might affect that client’s interests and the right to
expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client’s
benefit.58

Each client has a fairly broad right to be informed, and the lawyer is
required to tell every client about relevant issues to the representation
that could have an impact on that client’s interests.
Thus, consider the court’s decision to seal the settlement reached in
Murphy v. Dolgencorp, Inc., a case in which the lawyers represented
some eight hundred plaintiffs in courts across the U.S. who sought
overtime pay and other remedies for a single defendant’s violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).59 The plaintiffs joined the
defendant in petitioning the court to seal the settlement agreement,
which had been reached in one of the cases, so that the terms offered to
and agreed upon by that plaintiff would not be known by the other
plaintiffs represented by the same lawyer.60 The engagement letters
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 18.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57, 59 (2003) (exploring the
intraclient conflict of aggregation of corporate clients); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 17.3 (3d ed. 2001) (exploring the “entity” theory
of representation and comparing it with the “group” theory).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31.
59. Murphy v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00007, 2010 WL 4261310, at *1 (W.D. Va.
Oct. 28, 2010). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006)), standardized work-week hours, minimum
wage, prohibition of child labor, and other protections for workers.
60. Murphy, 2010 WL 4261310, at *1.
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provided that none of the plaintiffs would be told the terms of any
settlements reached with the lawyer’s other FSLA plaintiffs against that
defendant.61 Both plaintiff and defendant asserted that preventing the
other clients from knowing the terms of settlements reached in this case
would “allow negotiations to concentrate on the specific merits of each
individual case.”62 This seems, at best, to be a rather flimsy argument.
Presumably, the plaintiff in each lawsuit was the only participant from
whom this information was being withheld—all the other players were
fully aware of the details of the settlement negotiation with every other
plaintiff. If the managers making decisions for the defendant, the
company’s lawyers, and the plaintiffs’ lawyer were all able to
effectively compartmentalize their knowledge of other settlements, the
plaintiff should have also been trusted to do so. How does seeking to
keep his other clients in the dark comport with the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s
duty of loyalty? The only apparent benefit to each of the plaintiffs in
this arrangement was that their lawyer’s work on the other cases could
render the lawyer better informed and more efficient in his work on
their own case.63 The Murphy court assumed that the clients could
“understand and accept that their attorneys cannot tell them the terms of
other settlements in the course of advising them as to whether they
should accept a settlement offered.”64 Even if that were factually true,
however, it is difficult to reconcile the complete withholding of crucial
information from a client with the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to that client.
The example in Comment 31 to Model Rule 1.7 regarding
circumstances in which withholding information could be appropriate is
an entirely different situation:
In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to
proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after
being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information
confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that
failure to disclose one client’s trade secrets to another client will not
adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the
clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the
informed consent of both clients.65

Although technically each client is an individual client of the lawyer,
in substance, the pressures on the duty of loyalty in the representation of
groups of claimants have significant commonalities with those facing
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. *2 n.2 (reaching the conclusion that multiple representation’s primary benefit to
the client is a “better informed and more efficient advocate”).
64. Id.
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (2012).
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lawyers that represent multiple clients in a single matter. This situation
always presents a risk that the interests of the clients will come into
conflict; even lawyers who have carefully navigated the required
disclosures can find themselves in a situation where a divergence in the
interests of joint clients renders the conflict non-consentable. Even if
we posit, for argument’s sake, that the conflict could be a consentable
one, the limitations imposed on client autonomy by advance consent to
an unreached settlement are substantial.
Requiring clients to make a binding decision about whether to accept
a settlement offer before those clients understand the advantages and
disadvantages of what that offer will actually provide is contrary to the
core principle that each of the clients is an independent agent, entitled to
make his own informed decision regarding whether to compromise his
claim. When Charles Silver argues that it is a “mistaken notion” to
apply the rules designed for single-client representations to multipleclient settlements, including the rule requiring client control of
settlement decisions in single-client litigation,66 he risks opening
Pandora’s box. If compromising the client’s claim is, in Silver’s view,
not within the client’s control, then who controls it? It is entirely
possible that accusations of the ancient charges of champerty67 or
barratry68 will be dusted off and aimed at the claimants’ lawyer. The
operation of “welfare-enhancing social choice rules, whatever they may
be,” which Silver views as the replacement for the client’s decision,69
are an attempt to decisively take the decision-making power out of the
hands of the client without relocating that power to another actor. This

66. Charles Silver, Ethics and Innovation, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 763–64 (2011).
67. Champerty is “[a]n agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant
by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of
the judgment proceeds.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009). See also Roberts v.
Cooper, 61 U.S. (How.) 467, 471–72 (1857) (“The writ of champerty lieth where a man, by
covenant or agreement, made by writing or by word, agreeth to have a part of the thing, or land,
or debt, which is in suit, that shall be recovered if the party recover, to maintain and aid him in the
action and in the manner for which he sueth.” (citing 2 A. FITZ-HERBERT, NATURA
BREVIUM 171A (9th ed., 1794) (1534))). For a more recent definition, see Del Webb
Communities, Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Champerty generally
refers to an agreement in which a person without interest in another’s litigation undertakes to
carry on the litigation at his own expense, in whole or in part, in consideration of receiving, in the
event of success, a part of the proceeds of the litigation.” (internal citations omitted)).
68. “Put simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a
suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of
maintenance or champerty.” In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978). For more information
on champerty, see supra note 67 and accompanying text. See also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 170 (9th ed. 2009) (defining barratry as “[v]exatious incitement to litigation,
[especially] by soliciting potential legal clients”).
69. Silver, supra note 66, at 764.
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crowd-sourcing of the decision to settle is irretrievably indeterminate.
Even if Silver is right that individual client control is not the best way to
handle second-tier agency problems,70 individual client control has the
decided advantage of clearly identifying the participant who holds
decision-making power in the representation.
While highly experienced lawyers stand to gain when they are able to
package and deliver an entire group of claimants in aggregate litigation,
the incentives of plaintiffs’ lawyers are not aligned with those of their
individual clients. As Nancy Moore observed, this lack of alignment is
particularly apparent in an asymmetric information situation because the
clients are much less familiar about the legal context of the negotiation
than are the lawyers.71
Claimants’ lawyers can convince themselves that they are not taking
advantage of their clients even when they are actually doing so.
Research on the effects of cognitive biases building on Herbert Simon’s
“bounded rationality” theory has revealed the operation of various
biases through which information is filtered, including two that are
significant in this discussion—the confirmation bias and overconfidence
bias.72 People often filter incoming information “in ways that serve
their interests or preconceived notions.”73 Confirmation bias leads to a
human tendency to “exaggerate a correlation when doing so confirms
[the person’s] hypothesis,” because the decision-maker’s need to view
new data as consistent with his or her existing beliefs can influence his
or her assessment of that data as supporting the anticipated result.74
Researchers have also found that a stronger degree of overconfidence
bias is exhibited in situations in which a decision-maker engages in
abstract reasoning and assessing ambiguous information.75 In light of
70. Id.
71. Moore, Against Changing, supra note 24, at 179–81.
72. See Herbert A. Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 7
(1990).
73. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2000). See also
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV.
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175–89 (1998) (defining confirmation bias as the “seeking or interpreting of
evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis”).
74. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 649 (1999). See also Donald C. Langevoort,
Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors
(and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 104 (1997) (discussing the theory of
social constructionism, which is “how organizations perceive themselves, their goals, and their
environment, and the potential for myths in conditions of high ambiguity”).
75. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 74, at 648; Cynthia McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The
Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
157, 166 (2006).
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psychologists’ research on the confirmation bias and overconfidence
bias, it is understandable that it would be difficult for claimants’
lawyers to see their work on behalf of their clients as anything other
than strongly beneficial for their clients.
As Nancy Moore points out, important non-economic values are
expressed in Model Rule 1.8(g), and those values should be preserved
unless a convincing showing is made that the new course of action is
prudent.76 Under section 3.17 of the ALI Principles, a lawyer would be
allowed to represent clients whose claims can be concluded by a section
3.17(b) vote of the other claimants, while, at the same time, representing
one or more clients who, under section 3.17(a), opt to require individual
consent before settling their claims.77 The conflict-of-interest
difficulties involved in this set of representations could easily present a
non-consentable conflict.
For instance, in Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., the New
Jersey Supreme Court declared that individual consent to a settlement is
required, and that the New Jersey version of Model Rule 1.8(g) did not
permit clients to consent in advance to a decision by a majority of
claimants.78 However, that ruling was made only prospectively. The
court decided that when the law is uncertain or the defendant could have
reasonably relied on a different conception of the state of the law, the
appropriate and equitable disposition of the case called for enforcement
of the settlement against the Tax Authority.79 To further evaluate the
need for procedures tailored for aggregate litigation, the court suggested
that the state’s commission on reform of ethics standards should
consider whether “permitting less than unanimous agreement in multiplaintiff mass litigation” should be allowed.80 The chair of the
commission discussed the issue with Nancy Moore.81 But, as reported
by Charles Silver, the chair did not obtain the views of the scholars
whose work led the court to consider the need for changes to Model
Rule 1.8(g).82

76. See Moore, Against Changing, supra note 24, at 171–74.
77. See Morgan, supra note 9, at 751; ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 3.17(d).
78. 898 A.2d 512, 514–15 (N.J. 2006). This case is instructive because it was the first New
Jersey case to interpret Rule 18.(g) of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, which is
modeled after Model Rule 1.8(g). Id. at 523.
79. Id. at 522–23.
80. Id. at 523.
81. Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute’s Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate
Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want) Group Decision Making?, 57 DEPAUL L.
REV. 395, 397 n.16 (2008).
82. See Silver, supra note 66, at 762 n.53 (“The follow-up was not what the New Jersey
Supreme Court might have expected. Although the Commission’s Chair contacted Professor
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II. EXPLORING FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
A lawyer has fiduciary obligations to each of his clients, including
the obligation to act to advance that client’s interests.83 How, precisely,
is it in the interest of Client A to require Client A to stay in the
settlement group when Client A did not know all of the information
relevant to the wisdom of that course of action at the time Client A was
required to commit to staying in the settlement group? Some, including
Lynn Baker and Charles Silver, might argue that Client A would not
have any chance of recovery if that client tried to retain a lawyer for
only Client A’s cause alone. There is too little at stake to interest a
lawyer in just one claim. Even if that is true for a subset of situations in
which claims are aggregated, in other situations, clients whose claims
are large enough to stand alone are short-changed when those claims are
aggregated and lumped together with dozens—or thousands—of others.
As described in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers, a lawyer representing the members of a group of claimants
breaches a fiduciary duty owed to his client if that lawyer: (1) fails to
safeguard the client’s confidences, (2) mishandles the client’s property,
(3) engages in impermissible conflicts of interest, (4) is dishonest with
the client, or (5) uses the attorney-client relationship to take advantage
of the client.84 Impermissible conflicts of interest include conflicts
between differing sub-groups among the claimants, as well as conflicts
between the lawyer’s interest in wrapping up the entire case quickly and
the claimants’ interest in obtaining the best possible resolution in the
matter. The lawyer would also breach a fiduciary duty owed to each of
his clients if the lawyer were dishonest with the client, including
misrepresenting the degree of harm other claimants would suffer if the
global settlement is not achieved. Additionally, the lawyer for the
claimants would also breach a fiduciary duty owed to each client if he
uses the attorney-client relationship to obtain a multi-million dollar
legal fee while the client obtains only an unlikely-to-be-utilized coupon
in exchange for relinquishing his claim.
Nancy Moore, a prominent scholar known to favor preservation of the existing bar rules, the
Commission’s Chair failed to obtain the views of the authors [Charles Silver and Lynn Baker]
whose writings convinced the court to entertain the possibility of liberalizing the rules.”).
83. For an introduction to the fiduciary aspect of the lawyer-client relationship, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 2 (2012) (“A lawyer is an agent,
to whom clients entrust matters, property, and information, which may be of great importance and
sensitivity, and whose work is usually not subject to detailed client supervision because of its
complexity.”). See also Moore, Against Changing, supra note 24, at 176–77 (discussing the
fiduciary elements and the natural conflict of lawyer-client relationships).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (explaining the
duties owed to a client); id. § 49 (explaining generally the bases for malpractice liability).
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Charles Wolfram,85 Robert Flannigan,86 Kathleen Clark,87 Nancy
Moore,88 and Robert Cooter,89 among others, have explored the
dimensions of the fiduciary duties of lawyers and other professionals at
length. A key point for this discussion is that, in addition to an
allegation that the lawyer committed malpractice or an assertion that the
lawyer violated a duty under the jurisdiction’s code of professional
conduct, a lawyer’s breach of a fiduciary duty can be a separate,
independent basis for malpractice liability.90 Any jurisdiction
considering implementing the innovation promoted by Charles Silver
and reflected in section 3.17 of the ALI Principles must also grapple
with the implications of that innovation for the analysis of the lawyer’s
fiduciary obligations. Does a jurisdiction that recognizes a procedure
modeled on section 3.17 thereby also hold the position that multiple
clients represented by one lawyer are not owed the same fiduciary
duties that their lawyer would owe a client in an individual
representation? If an attorney can avoid some of the fiduciary duties he
would otherwise owe to a client by contracting around them, what, if
any, are the limits to that ability? If the engagement agreement asserted
that the lawyer owed the client no duty of confidentiality, loyalty, and
competence, would the arrangement described in that engagement
agreement still be cognizable as an attorney-client relationship? Surely

85. Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 689 (2006).
86. See generally Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 393 (2007) [hereinafter Flannigan, Accountability]; Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary
Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989).
87. See Kathleen Clark, Ethics, Employees and Contractors: Financial Conflicts of Interest In
and Out of Government, 62 ALA. L. REV. 961, 978–79 (2011) [hereinafter Clark, Ethics] (stating
that, when government contractors are entrusted with an asset, they should owe fiduciary duties);
Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary
Duty, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 63–79 (explaining fiduciary duty as a proper test to evaluate
ethical standards in federal government).
88. See Moore, Against Changing, supra note 24, at 176–77.
89. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, An Economic Model of the Fiduciary’s Duty of
Loyalty, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 297 (1990); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The
Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045 (1991).
90. Section 49 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides that a
claim for an attorney’s breach of fiduciary duty can be brought “in addition to other possible
bases of civil liability.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49
(2012). Charles W. Wolfram has strongly criticized this position. See Charles W. Wolfram, A
Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 692 (2006)
(“[C]ourts have allowed fiduciary breach claims to proliferate needlessly on the same ground
already adequately occupied by negligence. . . . [M]ost fiduciary breach claims are problematic
precisely because of their almost complete and useless overlap with available claims of
negligence.”).
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not. The fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client involves
obligations that cannot be contractually flouted.91 Public policy
considerations prohibit clients from agreeing to renounce lawyers’
fiduciary obligations.92 At the risk of reigniting the core values
discussion, the issue of what is contained in the irreducible set of
obligations that an attorney owes to his clients, in the context of an
aggregate settlement, merits serious consideration.
CONCLUSION
When a lawyer represents a group of clients in aggregate litigation,
that lawyer owes to each of his clients the full complement of duties that
he would owe to any client, notwithstanding the relationship between
the factual backgrounds in which each of the claims arose. The duty of
loyalty requires that each of an attorney’s clients must be afforded the
opportunity to autonomously direct the goals of the representation,
including instructing the attorney regarding the terms of a settlement
acceptable to the client as well as whether the client agrees to accept an
offer proposed by an opposing litigant. Requiring a client to make a
binding decision about whether to accept a settlement offer before that
client understands the advantages and disadvantages of that offer in the
client’s particular circumstances is contrary to the foundational concept
that each client remains a principal and the attorney is acting as his
agent. In addition, the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client
involves obligations running from the attorney to his client which
cannot be circumvented through contract. Although efficient allocation
of judicial resources is a relevant systemic concern, the lawyer’s
obligations to each of his clients have not yet been explicitly
subordinated to the interests of judges, lawyers, and others seeking
efficient resolution of claims.
Until a jurisdiction amends its
professional responsibility standards and governing law to permit the
changes articulated in the ALI Principles on this point, lawyers

91. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 887 (“[O]nce a court concludes that a particular relationship has a fiduciary
character, the parties’ manifest intention does not control their obligations to each other as
dispositively as it does under a contract analysis.”); Flannigan, Accountability, supra note 86, at
395–98 (stating that fiduciary duties cannot be circumvented by contract terms); Robert
Flannigan, Immunity Shopping, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 39 (2011) (discussing the core nature of
fiduciary obligations).
92. Clark, Ethics, supra note 87, at 979 (“[Fiduciary relationships] are governed not just by
the explicit terms of any agreement between the parties, but also by additional terms imposed by
the common law.”).
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practicing in the jurisdiction remain bound by that court’s currently
articulated standards.

